OpenAI API key in the browser bundle after a Claude Code session
Billable API access. Scraper bots drain exposed keys within minutes of publication.
Why Claude Code does this
A CLI agent working across the repo will follow the pattern it already sees. If one component reads a key from `import.meta.env`, the next feature it writes will too — the leak spreads by imitation rather than by a single mistake.
Confirm it first
Before rotating anything, check whether the key is actually being served. Paste your deployed URL — KeyDrift downloads the same JavaScript a visitor gets and tells you what is in it.
Rotate the key
Do this before changing any code. The key has been served to browsers, cached by CDNs and very likely scraped already — removing it from the source does not un-publish it.
- 1Revoke the key at platform.openai.com/api-keys.
- 2Check usage for the billing period — exposed keys are usually found by scrapers within minutes, and the charge lands before the alert does.
- 3Put the API call behind a server route with your own rate limiting, so a leaked route costs less than a leaked key.
Move the call to a server
The replacement key must not follow the old one into the bundle, which means the code that uses it cannot live in the browser.
Before — shipped to the browser
// src/components/Chat.tsx
// Vite substitutes the literal value here at build time.
const key = import.meta.env.VITE_OPENAI_API_KEY;
const result = await new OpenAI({ apiKey: key }).chat.completions.create(body);After — stays on a route handler or server action
// supabase/functions/chat/index.ts — runs on a route handler or server action
Deno.serve(async (request) => {
const key = Deno.env.get('OPENAI_API_KEY')!; // never sent to the browser
const result = await new OpenAI({ apiKey: key }).chat.completions.create(body);
return Response.json(result);
});
// src/components/Chat.tsx
const result = await fetch('/functions/v1/chat', { method: 'POST' }).then((r) => r.json());How KeyDrift detects it
Matches the modern `sk-proj-`, `sk-admin-` and `sk-svcacct-` prefixes over the full base64url alphabet, so a key containing `-` or `_` is captured whole rather than truncated at the first one.
It will happen again
A CLI agent working across the repo will follow the pattern it already sees. That has not changed because you fixed this one file — the next feature request produces the same shape of code. Continuous monitoring re-scans every deploy and tells you the moment a key comes back.