Resend API key in the browser bundle after a Claude Code session

Why Claude Code does this

A CLI agent working across the repo will follow the pattern it already sees. If one component reads a key from `import.meta.env`, the next feature it writes will too — the leak spreads by imitation rather than by a single mistake.

Confirm it first

Before rotating anything, check whether the key is actually being served. Paste your deployed URL — KeyDrift downloads the same JavaScript a visitor gets and tells you what is in it.

Rotate the key

Do this before changing any code. The key has been served to browsers, cached by CDNs and very likely scraped already — removing it from the source does not un-publish it.

1. 1Revoke the credential with its provider. Rotation is the only fix — the key is in the browser cache, in CDN edge nodes, and in whatever scraped the page.
2. 2Review the account for activity you did not initiate.
3. 3Move the call that needed it to a server route, so the browser never receives the replacement.

Move the call to a server

The replacement key must not follow the old one into the bundle, which means the code that uses it cannot live in the browser.

// src/components/Chat.tsx
// Vite substitutes the literal value here at build time.
const key = import.meta.env.VITE_API_KEY;
const result = await callTheApi(key, body);

// supabase/functions/proxy/index.ts  — runs on a route handler or server action
Deno.serve(async (request) => {
  const key = Deno.env.get('API_KEY')!; // never sent to the browser
  const result = await callTheApi(key, body);
  return Response.json(result);
});

// src/components/Chat.tsx
const result = await fetch('/functions/v1/proxy', { method: 'POST' }).then((r) => r.json());

How KeyDrift detects it

Matches the two-segment `re_` key format.